ORIGINAL

No.HQ CAA/1901/146/SIB

CAA

سول ایوی ایشن اتھارٹی

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

GROUND INCIDENT TO PIAC AIRCRAFT A-300 AP-BAY ON 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1992 AT JINNAH TERMINAL, Q.I.A.P. KARACHI

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

KARACHI, PAKISTAN

AIRCRAFT INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

GROUND INCIDENT TO PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AIRBUS A-300 AIRCRAFT AP-BAY OPERATING PK-301 ISLAMABAD - KARACHI ON 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1992

Authority: Director General, Civil Aviation Authority,
Memorandum No.HQ.CAA/1901/146/SIB
Dated 10th September, 1992.

COMPOSITION OF INVESTIGATION TEAM

i.	Engr.Ghulam Murtaza Controller of Airworthiness (South) CAA, QIAP	Investigator-in-Charge
ii.	Mr.Mohammad Ali Siddiqui Ops.Investigator CAA, Inspectorate QIAP	Investigator

SYNOPSIS

Aircraft Airbus A-300, Registration Marks AP-BAY, operating PK-301 Islamabad - Karachi, was scheduled to arrive at karachi at 1255 hrs on 10th September, 1992. This flight was however, delayed and landed Karachi at 1500 hrs. The aircraft was allocated Bay No.14 by the Duty Terminal Manager.

Earlier a Boeing-737 had been docked, at Bay No.14. After the departuer, of Boeing-737, the Aero Bridge was not fully retracted and its height was also low for A-300 as Boeing-737 entry door is low.

When PK-301 landed, it was brought to Bay No.14 by the **"FOLLOW-ME"**. The Marshaller guided the aircraft to the parking spot. While the aircraft was being parked, there was no bridge operator on the bridge. As the aircraft came near the bridge, the Marshaller noticed that there would be a collision between No.1 engine and the aero bridge and hence he gave the stop signal, while the aircraft was still behind the parking point, but by the time the aircraft halted its No.1 engine cowling had come in contact with the corner of the bridge resulting in minor rupture of the inlet cowling upper edge.

/1.OBSERVATIONS

1. OBSERVATIONS

1.1. The present procedure regarding allocation of bay and communcating the information to different agencies is very complicated. There are chances of missing out one odd agency resulting in Communication gap, specially when the ETA of aircraft are revised. DTM has the information about the vacant bays and allots the same to incoming A/c according to the inputs from ATC. He does not have input if the bay being allocated is manned or not. DTM informs FLIGHT INFORMATION DISPLAY SYSTEM (FIDS) CONTROL ROOM; GROUND CONTROLLER; AIRLINE OPERATOR; AND HANDLING AGENTS about the bay allocated to an incoming A/c. As per SOP Shift Incharge of Bridge operating personnel is not included in the list of agencies to whom bay allocation is to be conveyed, however, as a practice DTM does inform the Shift Incharge about the bay allocation. The Shift Incharge details Bridge operators to handle the bridge. In case of revision in ETA this arrangement creates confusion, specially because DTM does not maintain any chart to mark the agencies to whom the relevant information is passed.

1.2. There are a total of 6 bridges on each satellite. These are being operated normally by 4 aero bridge operators. During peak traffic one operator is required to man more than one bridge.

/1.3.The Shift

1.3. The Shift Incharge of bridge operators does not have a formal plan of bridge operation. On arrival/departure the available operator is deployed, sometimes causing confusion and delays.

1.4. There is no feed back from the bridge Operator to tower or DTM regarding readyness of the bridge to handle the incoming aircraft.

1.5. The prescribed procedure does not specific that after attending a departing aircraft the bridge should be fully retracted and the height adjusted so as not to pose an obstacle to an incoming aircraft.

1.6. Presently the aero bridge operating console does not have a guard to prevent unauthorised personnel from distrubing the controls while the bridge is unmanned.

1.7. There is no ground observer monitoring the movement of the bridge while it is being maneoured for positioning. The operator does not have ground view under neath the bridge cabin.

1.8. There is no marking on ground to indicate the correct parked position of the bridge which can serve as guidance for the bridge operating staff and the Marshaller.

1.9. There is no towing tractor to remove the bridge in case of power failure of normal operating system.

/2.FINDINGS

2. **FINDINGS**

2.1. The SOP of bridge operation does not clearly specify that the bridge should be fully retracted after departure of aircraft.

2.2. There are no markings on the ground to indicate that the bridge is in fully retracted position.

2.3. There are only 4 bridge operator in a Shift to take care of 6 bridges on each satellite. At times one operator is required to take care of more than one bridge.

2.4. On 10th September, 1992, Muhammad Arif Khan, Shift Incharge of Avio-Bridge Operators.

2.4.1. Failed to have PLB # 14 placed at an appropriate parking place for use by PK-301 after departure of PK-342 B-737 at 1013 Hours from the same bridge.

2.4.2. Failed to ensure proper deployment of bridge operators as per the planned bridge allocation.

2.4.3. Failed to take appropriate action when informed by the operations centre to have the bridge retracted for the parking of PK-301.

2.4.4. Being Shift Incharge has shown his ignorance about the procedures which have already been issued vide QIAP/5852/4/JTC dated 26th August, 1992. (App-'N').

/2.4.5.Failed

2.4.5. Failed to position bridge operator as per SOP after having been informed about the ETA of PK-301 by operations centre one hour before. (The ETA of PK-301 was passed by Mr.Latif Yar Khan between 1330 and 1400 hrs).

2.5. Mr.Umer Daraz, Fire Leader while Marshalling PK-301 on Bay - 14 failed to give timely signal to stop the aircraft though he had anticipated that the Avio-Bridge being low that might hit the aircraft.

2.6. On 10th September, 1992, Mr.Abdul Qadir, Avio-Bridge Operator:-

2.6.1. Failed to place the Avio-Bridge at an appropriate parking place for use by A-300.

2.6.2. Failed to position himself in time in Avio-Bridge No.14 to attend the arrival of PK-301.

3. **CAUSE**

3.1. The incident took place due to following reasons:-

3.1.1. The aero bridge # 14 was unmanned. This happened due to lack of communication among the relevant personnel and partly due to not following SOP by operators.

3.1.2. The bridge was not fully retracted and the height not adjusted after departure of B-737 aircraft.

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

4.1. Action may be taken against Shift Incharge Mr.Mohammad Arif Khan for not performing his duties in accordance with the laid down SOPs of docking traffic at the satellite.

4.2. Mr.Umer Daraz may be warned to be more careful while performing his duties as Marshaller by ensuring that the Avio is manned and in ready.

4.3. Mr.Abdul Qadir may be warned to be more careful while performing his duties as a Avio-Bridge Operator.

/4.4.Allocation.....

4.4. Allocation of bay should be done by ATC who should be in direct contact with the bridge operator.

4.5. A proper log book should be maintained on each bridge indicating actual time of handing over/taking over by the bridge operator.

4.6. Proper markings on the ground should be provided to indicate the parking position of aero bridges.

4.7. The Marshaller should be briefed not to bring in the aircraft unless the bridge is fully retracted and manned.

4.8. The bridge console should be provided with a locking panel so as to guard against operation by unauthorized personnel.

4.9. Before operation of the bridge, proper clearance must be obtained from a ground observer to avoid hitting any personnel, equipment or aircraft.

4.10. The existing SOPs relevant to aero bridge operation should also be amended as per above recommendations.

APP.

9

APP. 1

App. 'A'

10

App. 'B'

App. 'B5'

11

App.

App. B7

12

App. B8

App. 'B9'

13