

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
ISLAMABAD AIRPORT

TO INVESTIGATE INTO INCIDENT INVOLVING
B-747, REG. MK. AP-AYV, PK-300/230584
WHICH CAUSED DAMAGE TO UNITED STATE
C-12 AIRCRAFT, AT ISLAMABAD AIRPORT

1. INVESTIGATION

1-1	<u>History</u>	Not applicable.
1-2	<u>Injuries</u>	Khalid Khan, MODC guard was injured.
1-3	<u>Damage to aircraft</u>	None
1-4	<u>Other damage</u>	Two beach craft A/C of U.S. Embassy damaged. a. A/C C-12 D, S.NO. 83-0495 port wing badly damaged. b. A/C C-12 A, S.No. 76-0166 left wing O/B flap damaged. c. Six baggage containers badly damaged.
1-5	<u>Crew Information</u>	Capt. Hameed Malik.
1-6	<u>Aircraft Information</u>	B-747, Registration No. AP-AYV.
1-7	<u>Meteorological Information</u>	Moderate & calm.
1-8	<u>Aids to Navigation</u>	Not applicable.
1-9	<u>Communication</u>	Not applicable.
1-10	<u>Aerodrome and ground facilities</u>	Islamabad Airport.
1-11	<u>Flight recorders</u>	Not applicable.
1-12	<u>Wreckage</u>	Not applicable.
1-13	<u>Fire</u>	Not applicable.
1-14	<u>Survival aspects</u>	Not applicable.
1-15	<u>Tests and research</u>	Not applicable.
1-16	<u>Additional data</u>	Nil

2. ANALYSIS

- 2-1 PK-300/230584 landed at Islamabad Airport at 0852 hrs. L.T. Capt. Hameed Malik was the Commander of the aircraft. He was informed by DATCO to park his aircraft AP-AYV (B-747) at Bay No. 10. According to the statement of Capt. Hameed Malik (See Appendix "A") he informed DATCO that there were loose empty containers and two light aircraft were also parked close to the area of Bay No. 10 and as such it would be hazardous. Capt. Hameed Malik further stated that A.T.C. showed their inability to help him as the apron and the parking bays were under the jurisdiction of Civil Aviation Authority.
- 2-2 During the time the aircraft was being marshalled the aircraft had to do a clockwise turn from Bay No. 11 so that he was in a position for a nose-out parking as the Tug Master was unserviceable (See Appendix 'P'). During the turn the empty containers were blown off over the place and damaged the American aircraft No. C-12 D and C-12 A and M.O.D.C. tent. (See Appendix "R").
- 2-3 The visibility and wind condition during the parking was normal (See Appendix "S").
- 2-4 The tape extract of 23rd May, 1984 could not be obtained from the department. This equipment was put on trial basis on 22nd May, 1984. Although the recording was available for 22nd, 24th and 25th May, 1984 but the recording for 23rd May, 1984 was not available due to malfunctioning of the equipment (See Appendix "J"). This equipment was overhauled at Karachi and sent to Islamabad Airport for use. It is felt that the equipment is not fully serviceable.
- 2-5 According to the statement of DATCO, PK-300/230584 was advised to do nose-out parking on bay No. 10 as advised by the Marshaller. After the aircraft was parked Capt. Hameed Malik informed DATCO on R.T. that Bay No. 10 was not suitable for parking as lot of empty containers were

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lying around which have been blown off by the exhaust (See Appendix "A"). DATCO informed the Commander of the aircraft that this was not his responsibility as the area was under the jurisdiction of C.A.A. (See Appendix "B"). In the meantime DATCO was informed that two American aircraft No. C-12 D and C-12 A were damaged by the empty containers. DATCO Flt. Lt. Riaz A. Khan handed over the control to Flt. Lt. Jaffery and went to SATCO office and informed him and thereafter accompanied him to the scene of the accident (See Appendix "B").

2-6 Whenever the Tug Master was unserviceable, nose-out parking was to be done invariably by the wide bodied aircraft for which necessary instructions had been issued on the subject.

2-7 Duty aircraft Engineer stated that at about 0825 hrs. he informed Mr. Salahuddin Flight Operations Officer in the presence of Dy. Chief Engineer (N) that parking of B-747 (PK-300) was hazardous as the airbus (PK-727) was already parked on Bay No. 9. He further stated that either Bay No. 9 should be vacated before the parking of PK-300 or some other suitable area may be allocated. No Action had been taken by the Flight Operations Officer in this connection thereby contributing to this mishap (See Appendix "F").

2-8 According to the statement of Mr. Salahuddin Flight Operation officer he was informed 30 minutes before arrival of PK-300 by Mr. Bashir Ahmed, Duty Aircraft Engineer/and requested for an early departure of PK-727 (Airbus). Mr. Salahuddin coordinated with GOC and briefed the crew accordingly for on time departure but later on it could not be done due to temperature consideration, hence the cargo was to be off loaded. He did not take any action for the safety of PK-300 as advised to him by the Aircraft Engineer and Wing Commander, Khawaja, Duty Airport Officer, which he denied (See Appendix "F").

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- 2-9 It was pointed out that the aircraft was over fuelled and therefore it had to be defuelled and Airport Manager was requested to provide crash tender (See Appendix "H") and thus the statement of Duty Controller that Cargo had to be off loaded due to temp. condition is wrong.
- 2-10 The detailed extent of damage is given in Appendix "K" which was duly signed by Capt. Lowe and Capt. Hudson of U.S. Embassy aircraft alongwith Mr. Taj Muhammad Sr. Airworthiness surveyor CAA, Islamabad Airport and Flt. Lt. Iftikhar M.T. Eng. P.A.F. Base, Chaklala. Photographs showing the damage to the aircraft are attached as Appendix "R". Layout diagram of scene of accident (App."Q").
- 2-11 Marshaller Lal Khan stated (See Appendix "C") that Wg. Cdr. Hashmat A. Khwaja, Duty Airport Officer instructed him for nose-out parking of the aircraft at Bay No. 10 thus he followed the instructions and parked the aircraft with the assistance of Sr. Technician Mr. Shaukat who was giving wing tip clearance (See Appendix "C" , "D" & "L").
- 2-12 The Marshallers at Islamabad Airport have not been trained and do not have a certificate to that effect. They have been given O.J.T. only. These marshallers are not familiar with the facts of Jet blast and it is not possible for them to comprehend the various implications, while marshalling the aircraft because of lack of experience and proper training.
- 2-13 Commander of PK-300 inspite of the fact that he realised that parking in area with empty containers was dangerous, failed to take any positive action for the Safety of aircraft (See Appendix "A").
- 2-14 Although on the request of Station Traffic Manager parking of empty containers was allowed by the Airport Manager (See Appendix "G") he was also advised to ensure that equipment were properly lashed (See App."O")

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which was not done. Had the equipment been lashed properly this incident/accident could have been avoided. Furthermore it was pointed out in P.I.A. monthly Flight Safety meetings (See Appendix "U").

- 2-15 According to statement of Gp. Capt. Bashir Ahmed Dy. Airport Manager (Ops), He informed the Airport Manager and confirmed the Marshaller on Walkie Talkie regarding parking arrangement. The Marshaller stated that all arrangements have been made in coordination with Engineering staff for parking of PK-300. He was also advised to ensure the availability of Engg. officer for giving clearance from the parking aircraft and other obstructions. This was a standard procedure whenever the Tug Master was unserviceable (See Appendix "G"). He further stated that Islamabad was a joint user airfield. The responsibility regarding operations of aircraft was done by P.A.F. ATC. According to the regulation contained in PAF AFM 60-13 and ICAO 4444 (See Annexure 2 & 3)/. The inspection of the Maneuvring area, runway, taxiway and apron is to be carried out by Aerodrome Controller. The information regarding hazardous situation, ground obstruction or any other information in this regard must be passed by Aerodrome Controller to the Capt. of the aircraft (See Annexure 2 & 3)/. The Pilot on receiving such information or noticing himself must take necessary steps to ensure the Safety of the aircraft (See Annexure 3), of App. "G".
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- 2-16 DATCO by simply stating that apron was hardly visible from his place of duty cannot absolve himself from the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the aircraft on the ground particularly during parking and taxi out (See Appendix "B" and Annexure 2), of Appendix "G".

- 2-17 The Tape equipment was not functioning properly. It should be replaced with a serviceable Tape equipment.

/Conclusion

3. CONCLUSION

- 3-1 Capt. Hameed Malik Commander of PK-300 is held responsible for failing to ensure the Safety of the aircraft. He saw the empty containers and realised that they were going to be blown off due to the exhaust of B-747 but did not take any preventive action (See Appendix "A").
- 3-2 DATCO P.A.F. Base, Chaklala is responsible for failing to guide the Commander of PK-300, inspite of the fact that he was told by the Commander of PK-300 of the hazardous situation. His responsibilities are laid down in P.A.F. AFM 60-13 and ICAO regulation (See Annexure 2 & 3) of App."G".
- 3-3 Mr. Salahuddin Flight Operation Officer is responsible for failing to coordinate the Safe parking of PK-300 in that he was asked to clear PK-727 (Airbus) in time so that the aircraft PK-300 could be given nose-out parking. If the departure of PK-727 was delayed due to one reason or other; he should have communicated to DATCO and Capt. of the aircraft to stop them for nose-out parking at bay No. 10.
- 3-4 Duty Engineer is also responsible for this incident. By simply informing Flight Operation Officer, is not considered adequate. When he was fully aware of the dangerous situation, he should have asked the marshaller to stop the aircraft from being manoeuvred into nose-out parking.
- 3-5 Station Traffic Manager is responsible for this incident, of the in that he failed to ensure lashing /containers as advised by CAA, Islamabad Airport and also discussed in monthly P.I.A. Flight Safety Meetings (See Appendix "U" & "O").
- 3-6 Marshaller Lal Khan was unqualified and had no experience in carrying out nose-out parking and therefore he could not realise the hazardous situation while he was marshalling the B-747 aircraft (PK-300) (See Appendix 'C' & 'G').

/Recommendations

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4-1 Suitable action may be taken against:-

4-1-1 Capt. of aircraft for failing to ensure the Safety of the aircraft particularly when he was aware of the danger involved.

4-1-2 DATCO PAF Base, Chaklala for failing to perform his duties in accordance with laid down instruction PAF /of Appendix "G". AFM 60-13 and ICAO 4444 (See Annexure 2 & 3)/thereby endangering the Safety of the aircraft.

4-1-3 Duty Aircraft Engineer, for failing to take appropriate action to prevent this incident. By merely informing Flight Operations Officer he cannot be absolved of his responsibility. He should have instructed the Marshaller to stop the aircraft since he was aware of the danger involved.

4-1-4 Mr. Salahuddin Duty Controller failing to inform the DATCO and Commander of PK-300 of the hazardous situation.

4-2 Trained and qualified Marshaller be detailed for parking of aircraft; as it continues to be a weak area.

4-3 Only one wide bodied aircraft should be parked in the area of bay No. 9, 10 & 11 during nose-out parking.

4-4 P.I.A. must immediately provide second Tug Master so as to preclude reoccurrence of similar incident.

4-5 Flight Operation P.I.A. should be instructed to exercise better supervision and close coordination with Commander of aircraft, DATCO and CAA, at all times.

4-6 Duty Aircraft Engineers must exercise more care and vigilance while performing their duties.

4-7 Airport Manager should issue comprehensive instructions/procedures to be followed in case of Nose-out parking bodied aircraft, keeping