

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

On 24th October, 1988, Mr. Syed Shariq Hassan, CPL No. 1385, an A.F.I. and an employee of M/S Raji Aviation (Pvt) Ltd was authorised by the C.F.I. of M/S Raji Aviation (Pvt) Ltd to fly a training X. country mission from Karachi to Nawab Shah - Mirpur Khas - Hyderabad - Karachi with a student pilot named Mr. Tanveer Alam, on Cessna-150 aircraft Regd No. AP-BCS. After having obtained the F.I.C. clearance and weather report, the aircraft took off at 1050 hours (Local) and climbed to 5500 feet and was expected to reach OPNH at about 12:10 hours. After having flown for about an hour on the first leg the pilot lost track of his ground position and tried in vain to reach Nawab Shah. The Pilot informed Nawab Shah Tower that he was uncertain of his position and requested Capt. Salim, C.F.I. Quetta Flying Club, who happened to have landed at Nawab Shah enroute to Karachi, to come and assist the Pilot of Cessna-150 aircraft. Capt. Salim took off in his Cessna-172 aircraft Callsign AP-BBE and managed to locate the lost pilot and guided him to land at Nawab Shah safely at 1355 hours without any further occurrence.

DISCUSSION

1. Cessna Aircraft 150 AP-BCS was serviced with full fuel and had a serviceable Magnetic Compass. Its A.D.F. system was out of order but V.O.R. was presumably partially serviceable but not reliable. The documents do not support the contention of the C.F.I. that V.O.R. was fully serviceable. Representative of the Airworthiness Department also found VOR needle stuck to the right, at OPNH. Thus the aircraft had a Magnetic Compass only as a navigational aid, on board.
2. Weather Conditions were good. The visibility was about 4-5 K.M. and not a speck of cloud. After proper clearance from F.I.C./ATC Karachi the aircraft took off at 1050 hours (Local) and set course for OPNH. The ETA for Nawab Shah was 1210 hours (Exhibit 'A'). After getting airborne the pilot reported exiting control zone and thereafter he flew almost 2:45 hours before he reached Nawab Shah with the help of Capt. Salimuzzaman (C.F.I. Quetta Flying Club). Between the time when AP-BCS exited the control zone and it reached River Indus, the aircraft seems to have drift off the track to the right and the pilot made no effort to check his position as the flight progressed after control zone boundary. Otherwise he would have realised right at the first check point SARI SING (at hamlet), which he claims (Exhibit 'D') to have reached within 2 minutes of the E.T.A. According to the log card enteries he even made the second check point (i.e. Village Mehr Khan) on time. It is quite paradoxical to say that although the aircraft was on track initially but between Fourth Check Point (MEHR KHAN VILLAGE) and the fifth check point (Indus), it developed so much of a drift that the pilot could not keep up with the actual progressive ground position of the aircraft, which was flying at such a slow speed (90 M.P.H.). Thus either the pilots acted so callously that it was the aircraft that flew them the way it felt like or the pilots had intentionally made a deviation from their planned route (between Karachi and Nawab Shah) and fell victim to it later, because they were mentally not prepared for and the V.O.R. also did not happen to side with them. "There is no plausible explanation as to where did the pilot spend all this time". The pilot's contention that he kept circling over Village SUNN initially and then followed the railway line with an intent to reach Sakrand too is not convincing. This exercise should not have taken him more than half an hour and after this he, in any case, ought to have abandoned it, particularly

/ when

when the indicated fuel quantity was running low. He appears to have mistaken Saidabad (a small village South of Sakrand) for Sakrand. Whereas Sakrand has a very distinct land feature (a railway line branching off to North Easterly direction for Nawab Shah) that clearly differentiates it from other villages/towns along this railway line. This only proves that the Instructor Pilot was thoroughly confused and displayed extremely poor air sense.

3. The Captain of this aircraft violated all the good points of airmanship and safety. In that, he neither tried to conserve fuel, nor took a positive step to make a recovery or declare himself as lost. He even failed to follow the general lost procedure applicable in this area. All he had to do was to come back to River Indus and follow it down stream to Hyderabad and then head back for Karachi or decide otherwise depending upon the fuel stock.

4. Later, Capt. Salimuzzaman, who acted as a search and rescue pilot advised AP*BCS to fly along the River Indus down stream (Southerly heading) and then turn about to follow the River Up stream (Northerly heading) and spotted him coming head on. It only proves that the pilot was thoroughly confused, for what reasons, is not known. May be he was mentally disturbed. At one stage the student pilot (Witness No.3) also suggested to the I.P. that they should follow the River and try to locate Hyderabad but the I.P. continued to waste time in ascertaining his position, with complete disregard to the fuel state.

5. The standby Compass was reported to have toppled and an entry was made to that effect in the voyage report (see Exhibit ' '). Not only that, this is an unknown term/defect for a magnetic compass, the magnetic compass was found fully serviceable, when checked by the Airworthiness Representative (Exhibit ' ') at Nawab Shah. However, the VOR needle was found to have got stuck to the right, which in any case was unserviceable. The pilot had not checked its function before take off. The A.D.F. system though installed was not serviceable. Thus technically speaking the aircraft was not fully fit, particularly when it was to proceed on a long X-country flight.

/ 6. The

6. The inference that can be drawn from the evidence adduced by various witnesses, is that had the C.F.I. Quetta Flying Club not been available with a ready aircraft at Nawab Shah the scene was all set for a major accident. The I.P. had converted a simple matter into a maze.

OBSERVATIONS

1. The aircraft magnetic compass was serviceable throughout the flight but its A.D.F. and V.O.R. were unserviceable and thus the aircraft, technically, was not worthy of Nav. mission.
2. The Instructor Pilot displayed extremely low standard of instructional ability both on the ground and in the air.
3. The Chief Flying Instructor supervised the briefing and he was satisfied with this standard of map preparation and flight log.
4. M/S Raji Aviation does not have flight log cards, student grading slips, which are important.
5. The U/S tagg for ADF showing its unserviceability was not affixed in the aircraft by engineer incharge before the start of journey.
6. There was no serial number of D.R. compass fixed in the aircraft so compass swing checks are not reliable.
7. Quantity of fuel supplied to this particular aircraft not recorded.

F I N D I N G S

1. The aircraft Cessna-150 AP-BCS was serviced with full fuel i.e. 26 gallons.
2. The map carried by the pilots was very poorly prepared. In fact it had also a few other tracks already drawn on it (Exhibit "D-1").
3. A loose paper sheet has been used to record the flight log, ETA/ATA etc. It has a very scanty information jotted down on it.
4. The Instructor Pilot did not conduct a thorough briefing of the S.P.
5. The aircraft strayed off the track due to carelessness of the pilots and consequently got lost.
6. The pilot failed to follow general lost procedure and flew aimless and wasted fuel for two hours.
7. The pilot kept giving fake ground positions and E.T.As. to OPNH tower.
8. Coverage in maintenance checks of aircraft for appropriate areas regarding serviceability of VOR and ADF is not available in existing maintenance schedule.
9. The Instructor Pilot Mr. Syed Shariq Hassan is blamed for the incident.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A.F.I. Rating of Mr. Syed Shariq Hassan CPL No. 1385 be withdrawn and his C.P.L. be suspended for three months as a punitive measure.
2. Authorization to conduct flying training by M/S Raji Aviation (Pvt) Ltd. may be reviewed/re-evaluated before their licence is renewed in December, 1988.
3. A six monthly categorization/evaluation of flying Instructors (A.F.I. and F.I.) belonging to general aviation be introduced.
4. A periodic checks for the coverage of Cat 'X' and 'R' work area in existing maintenance schedule of Cessna 150 aircraft AP-BCS be introduced immediately with the approval of Airworthiness Authorities.

Local I