

## CONTENTS

1. DIRECTIVE OF D.G.CAA.
2. DIARY OF ACTION.
3. NARRATION OF EVENTS.
4. FINDINGS.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.
6. STATEMENTS S-1 TO S-39.



CONFIDENTIAL

**INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE HI-JACK ACCIDENT**  
**ON PAN AM BOEING 747, FLIGHT NO. PA-073 ON**  
**5TH SEPTEMBER, 1986 AT KARACHI AIRPORT**

The Director General Civil Aviation Authority in exercise of power conferred by Rule 329 of the CAA Rules 1978, and in consultation with Secretary Defence, appointed a team of Investigators to probe into Hi-Jacking to PAN AM Boeing 747 aircraft bearing Registration marks N656 PA which occurred on the 5th September, 1986 at Karachi Airport.

2. The team comprised of the following:-

- |       |                                                                                      |                         |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| (i)   | Air Commodore (Retd)<br>Aziz Ahmad,<br>Chief Inspector,<br>Civil Aviation Authority. | Incharge Investigation. |
| (ii)  | Captain Farmanuddin,<br>Pilot Chief Investigator,<br>Civil Aviation Authority.       | Investigator.           |
| (iii) | Mr. Arif M. Mir,<br>Chief of Airworthiness,<br>Civil Aviation Authority.             | Investigator.           |

3. The Investigation Team was received by the director General on the afternoon of 6th September, 1986 in his camp office at Karachi Airport. He gave verbal directions to the team, to carry out an additional task of an in-house inquiry under the following terms of reference:-

- (a) To determine the sequence of events leading to the forceful entry of Hi-Jackers.
- (b) To look into the implementation of the airport anti-hijacking plan.
- (c) Examine the events leading upto the counter action to terminate the hijacking.
- (d) To ascertain any weaknesses in the system and make recommendations.

Contd..... 2



DIARY OF ACTION6th Sept., 1986

- 1600-1630 The investigation team was received by the Director General. He gave detailed briefing about the occurrence.
- 1630-1700 Team held initial meeting to chalk out programme for the remaining day. Mr. Ghulam Murtaza, Senior Airworthiness Surveyor coopted to assist in preparing the damage report. Zonal Manager Office was selected as Camp Office.
- 1700-~~1730~~ Initial discussions were held with Chief Security Officer, Airport Security Force.
- 1730-1830 Detailed external and internal inspection of the aircraft carried out.
- 1900-1930 Visited Pan Am Office to contact Mr. Daroga. Contact could not be established.
- 2000 Proceeding closed for the day.

7th Sept., 1986

- 0900-0930 Team assembled in the Camp Office. Chalked out programme for the day.
- 0930-1230 Statements of ATC personnel recorded.
- 1230-1300 Photographs of damaged area taken.
- 1300-1330 Lunch break.
- 1330.1600 Statements of Crash Fire and Rescue Officer were recorded.
- 1600-1700 Statements of ATC Supervisor/Coordinator recorded.
- 1700-2130 Statements of ASF guards, who were on duty at export cargo gate and near the aircraft, were recorded.

8th Sept., 1986

- 0900-0930 Team assembled and meeting held to chalk out day's programme.
- 0930-1130 Photographs of damaged area taken.
- 1130-1300 Recorded statements of ATC personnel which had not been recorded.
- 1400-1600 Attended DG CAA Conference in the conference room at Karachi Airport.

1635-1645/...P-3..



1635-1645 DG CAA briefed Chief Inspector to send a revised telex to the Ministry of Defence.

1730 Revised telex issued.

9th Sept., 1986

0900-0930 Team assembled in camp office. Plan for the day finalised.

0930-1130 Details of aircraft were collected from Pan Am and statements of their two employees recorded.

1130-1200 Statement of DAPO recorded.

1200-1300 Tape extract of VHF/RT 121.8 MHZ collected from C.O.O.

1330-1400 Statement of C.O.O. recorded.

1430-2230 Writing of report.

10th Sept., 1986

0900-0930 Team held meeting and chalked out programme for the day.

0930-1030 Statement of Mr. Daroga Country Manager Pan Am was recorded.

1030-1130 Mohammad Akbar PIA Operator statement recorded.

1130-1245 Statement of PIAC Security Guard.

1245-1330 Statement of Brig. Sumbal.

1330-1400 Lunch break.

1400-1600 Visit to aircraft, photograph taken statement of two Pan Am employees recorded.

1600-1700 Statement of Mr. Bashir Ahmed Driver Shaheen Airport Services.

1700-1800 Statement of Mr. Afzal Ahmed, Station Supdt, Kuwait Airways.

1800-2200 Review of evidence and typing of statements etc.

11th Sept., 1986

0900-1100 Investigation team meeting with the Director General.

1100-1300 Recording of statement of the Airport Manager Karachi Airport.

1300-1330 Lunch break.

1330-2200 Writing of report.

2200-2230 Establishing contact with DAPO and handing over report to him for despatch by PK-300 departing at 0700 hours on 12th Sept. 1986 for submission to Secretary Ministry of Defence.

12th Sept., 1986

Friday - Day off.

13th Sept., 1986

0800-0900 Meeting held by the investigation team to prepare plan for the day.

0900-0930 Statement of KLM guard recorded.

0930-1000 Statement/....



|           |                                                                        |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0930-1000 | Statement of Custom Officers working at export cargo complex recorded. |
| 1000-1100 | Statement of Najor Amin recorded.                                      |
| 1100-1200 | Statement of Brig. Amir Khan, CAA Security recorded.                   |
| 1200-1300 | Recording Statement of DAPO.                                           |
| 1300-1330 | Lunch Break.                                                           |
| 1330-1930 | Writing of 2nd Report.                                                 |

14th September, 1986

|           |                                                            |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0800-0900 | Meeting of Investigation team to prepare plan for the day. |
| 0900-1300 | Writing of 2nd report continued.                           |
| 1300-1330 | Lunch Break.                                               |
| 1330-1500 | Review and finalization of report.                         |



NARRATIVE EVENTS

1. On the 5th September, 1986, M/s Pan Am schedule passenger flight No.073 arrived from Bombay at 0510 P.S.T. The aircraft was in transit with 284 passengers on board. A total of 16 crew, including 3 cockpit crew were also on board. Seventy eight passengers were to board from Karachi, for further details, see Appendix.
2. At approximately 0555 hours on the 5th September, 1986 a tractor towing two pallets entered the export cargo gate. The vehicle was driven by Mr.Muhammad Akbar, a driver employed on daily wages by PIAC.
3. No sooner did the trailing end of the second pallet cleared the gate, a Suzuki Van dashed past the gate, heading towards bay no.9, where the Pan Am B747, operating flight No.073, was parked. The two ASF personnel present at the gate made no efforts to chase the vehicle or fire a warning shot in the air to alarm other persons present at the apron.
4. With the speed the Suzuki Van entered the apron, it practically took no time to cover the short distance to reach the aeroplane parked on bay No.9.
5. The Van pulled up between the first class and economy class stairs.
6. Doors of the vehicle opened and four persons leaped out and boarded the aircraft. Two of the intruders were in uniform dashed up the stairs leading to the economy class, whilst the other two, one in uniform and one in Kurta Shalwar, rushed through stairs leading entry to first class.
7. The two unarmed guards of ASF on duty at bay No.9, made no efforts to stop entry of the intruders. The hijackers seized control of the aircraft.
8. The hijackers tried to close the economy class door but failed. A Pan Am mechanic operator volunteered to go up and close the door. As he moved, the hijacker misunderstood his intension. They fired three gun shots aimed at him. These shots missed the Pan Am employee but hit a PIAC loader, who was working on bay No.10 on Kuwait aircraft.
9. Finally the mechanic operator was permitted to go up and close the economy class door. Whilst the first class door was closed by the Airhostess with guidance from the same mechanic operator.
10. At 0602 the control tower received a call from the aircraft on VHF/RT frequency 118.3 MHZ informing that there was a man with machine gun in the first class cabin. Soon after seizure of the aircraft, the 3 flight crew climbed out the emergency hatch winched themselves down, using ropes provided in the

Contd..... 6



cockpit for evacuation. After landing on the tarmac the crew proceeded in the passenger terminal. This action of crew effectively immobilised the aircraft.

11. As per the emergency plan the ATC personnel informed all concerned mentioned in the plan.
12. The Director General could not be contacted due to unserviceability of both of his residential telephones.
13. He was informed by the Chief of Staff who visited him after he had been informed of the occurrence by the Airport Manager.
14. Governor Sind, Gen. Jahan Dad Khan visited the control tower at 0740 hours. He was given complete briefing by the Director Operation CAA with respect to the occurrence.
15. Emergency command post was established at Karachi Airport under the command of Governor Sind.
16. The hijackers asked for interpreter who could speak to them in the Arabic. Mr. Daroga, Country Manager of Pan Am was able to provide services of Security Officer of M/s Kuwait Airways, who was available on adjacent Bay No.10. contact with hijackers was then established using megaphone.
17. The hijackers insisted that the cockpit crew and fuel be immediately provided for flight to Cyprus. They threatened that they will start killing one passengers at a time unless the crew was provided. The Pan Am informed the hijackers that crew was not traceable and that they should address their demands to the Pakistan Government.
18. The hijackers repeated their demand and gave 10 minutes ultimatum. However, within a few minutes they brought a passenger to the door and held him with a gun pointing at his head.
19. Immediately after a gun shot, a puff of smoke was seen and a passengers dropped on the apron. A gun also fell from the door alongwith the human body. The door was closed. Body of the passenger was retrieved and sent by an ambulance to the hospital.
20. At 0815 hours the Force Commander Airport Security Force briefed the Governor on terrorist details.



21. At 0855 hours the Governor contacted General K.M.Arif, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff about the occurrence.
22. At 0900 hours the Director General gave detailed instructions to CAA personnel highlighting provision of Fire and medical facilities.
23. The Director General also asked for provision of an interpreter after the employee of Kuwait Airways had shown his inability to continue.
24. At 0930 hours services of Mr.Nasim proceeded to aircraft. They offered field telephone. the Hijackers turned down the offer.
25. Mr.Daroga conveyed to the hijackers that Mr.Kharas, a Pan Am mechanic, was on board the aircraft who could handle the aircraft radio. He advised them to select company's cut channel.
26. The Director General alongwith Mr.Daroga and Mr.Nasim visited the flight operation office of Pan Am. They a gave call to the aircraft. The call was responded by hijackers.
27. Communication were established with the hijackers on company channel at 1000 hours. They hijackers promised to release women and children on receipt of crew. They gave Larnaca Cyprus as their destination. They were informed that the flight crew was being arranged from — Europe. They were also informed that it would take considerable time before the crew arrived.
28. Demands of the hijackers were conveyed to M/s Pan Am HQ. All efforts were made by the Director General to prolong the talks and to keep the hijackers calm.
29. From the time the aircraft was seized, it was noticed that the hijackers were impatient. They displayed such attitude throughout the day. They repeatedly warned against any one coming close to aircraft. They also refused a portable radio when offered. They declared to take any food and water supply.
30. Another request was made by the Director General for release of women, children and sick persons. This request was turned down by the hijackers. They were adamant that they would not release any one till the cockpit crew came on board.
31. At/.....



31. At 1115 hours the Director General issued directions to CAA staff on control of road traffic. This was done for smooth passage for ambulance/fire tenders etc.
32. Activation of hot lines got delayed. It was only at 1130 hours that communications were established fully. The process had been initiated at 0700 hours. It delayed proper functioning of Command HQ. Two Non-STD local telephones for press and TV were also delayed upto 1335 hours.
33. Instructions were given by the Governor to arrange extinguishing selected apron towers flood lights under orders of the Corp Commander. At dusk, they enquired as to why apron lights were off. They were informed that those were unserviceable and that efforts were being made to put them serviceable.
34. Since Pan Am were unable to position cockpit crew by 1800 hours, the Director General informed the hijackers that their deadline of 1900 hours could not be met. They were also informed that Cyprus had expressed its inability to accept the aircraft.
35. On receipt of the above information the hijackers repeated their demand. After prolonged dialogue held by the D.G., the hijackers agreed to extend the deadline to 2400 hours.
36. Important operational lines to the Command Post near the aircraft were considerably delayed till about 1800 hours.
37. Corps Commander through his C.O.S. gave orders to keep lights of bay No.9 to 15 off. Execution of the scheme was considerably delayed due to ASF preventing the work parties to approach the towers in the vicinity of the affected area.
38. The hijackers stopped communication with the negotiators at 1945 hours for reason unknown. At 9.25 it was observed that the cockpit was not manned and hence the reason for no radio contact.
39. The APU was running continuously from 0500 hours. Duration of operation of the unit could not be predicted with accuracy. The fuel and oil was sufficient to run for several days. However, it packed up at 2126 hours due to overheat conditions caused due to a rupture in the cooling duct of the unit.
40. After failure of APU, the Director General took Mr. Daroga and the interpreter to convince the hijackers for connecting the ground power unit. This unit would have restored lighting and airconditioning in addition to restoration of radio communication facility.
41. When the above mentioned party reached approximately 200 yards short of the aircraft, they heard gun shots and explosions coming from inside the aircraft. The Director General requested for commando action.
42. Immediately after the firing started the right side door (R4) opened and its escape chute inflated.



43. Passengers started coming out of this door. Soon after the left side door (4) also opened and its chute deployed. Now both doors were used by passengers for escape.
44. The doors near the wings L3 and L3 also opened. However, their chutes did not deploy. Consequently these were not used.
45. Soon a large number of passengers were seen exiting from the rear right of the aircraft via emergency chutes barring one passenger.
46. The first passenger who came in contact with the negotiating team, informed that hijackers had started shooting everyone indiscriminately.
47. The above information was immediately transmitted on ground radio close vicinity reached the scene after some minutes.
48. The rescue agencies also came under fire but soon managed to surround and board the aircraft once inside they opened additional chutes for escape of the remaining passengers. Shooting inside stopped in about 5 minutes.
49. One hijacker was critically wounded inside the aircraft. The others exited with the passengers, and were captured later at various locations in the Terminal area.
50. Security forces captured all weapons, made aircraft safe from grenades/dynamite etc. & evacuated the aircraft of the dead and the critically wounded. The entire action took about fifteen minutes.
51. The dead and injured passengers were taken to hospitals which had been alerted in the morning. This operation went very well.
52. The ambulances which had been collected outside the restricted area were initially prevented by police from entering the restricted area. This delayed their arrival at the scene of accident.
53. The passengers ran towards Terminal-2. Some of them made their exit through gate near Terminal-2, while others were stopped by the ASF and made to lie down on the apron.
54. One hijacker managed to get outside the restricted area but was apprehended by the security agencies on recognition of passengers.
55. The lights in Terminal-2 were switched off accidentally. The emergency lights did not come on immediately. These lights were restored after 5 minutes.
56. On their arrival in Terminal-2, the passengers were provided refreshments and were looked after by CAA personnel.

Contd.....10.



57. After the passengers had left the area, lights were activated on the apron and the remaining casualties were cleared from the aircraft. Control of the aircraft was taken over by the Army. Later it was handed over to the Airport Security force.

58. The entire operation including evacuation of the dead and injured and remaining passengers to various hotels took about an hour.

59. Total of 141 passengers were sent to hospitals including 15 dead. Five critically wounded died during next 3 to 4 days. Their nationalities are as follows:-

|           |    |
|-----------|----|
| INDIANS   | 12 |
| PAKISTANI | 04 |
| OTHERS    | 04 |

60. Aircraft was damaged from inside, but there was no structural damage.



APPENDIX TOHQCAA/1000/1/DGSDATED September, 1986

| <u>NATIONALITY</u> | <u>BOMBAY BOARDED</u> | <u>KARACHI BOARDED</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| AMERICAN           | 41                    | 18                     | 59           |
| CANADIAN           | 06                    | 06                     | 12           |
| BRITISH            | 08                    | 07                     | 15           |
| MEXICO             | 01                    | 01                     | 02           |
| AFGHANS            | 02                    | 01                     | 03           |
| GERMANS            | 03                    | 03                     | 06           |
| AUSTRAIAN          | 01                    | 01                     | 02           |
| SWEDISH            | 02                    | 02                     | 04           |
| PAKISTANI          | 70                    | 39                     | 109          |
| INDIAN             | 150                   | -                      | 150          |
|                    | <hr/> 284             | <hr/> 78               | <hr/> 362    |

Additional Personnel

6 PAN AM Ground crew were trapped on board the aircraft when it was seized.



## FINDINGS

### Hijack Occurrence

1. The Security arrangements at the Export Cargo gate, which is next to the parking apron, were not adequate and effective.
2. There is no system or plan to prevent a forceful entry or to deal with any party which has forcefully crossed the gate.
3. There is no facility to chase any party or to raise alarms to alert other guards on the apron.
4. The guards at the aircraft are inadequate, un-equipped and untrained to meet any forceful entry by a group armed intruders.
5. It appears that the escaping of the flight crew is part of a planned anti-hijacking scheme, of immobilizing the aircraft, adopted by the United States of America.
6. With the exit of the flight crew, there was no radio contact with the aircraft for over three hours. Initial contact was however established through a megaphone and then a mechanic on board the aircraft was asked to switch on the special company frequency for further contacts.

### Implementation of Anti-Hijack Plan

7. The anti-hijack plan of the airport came into operation immediately after the call from the flight crew.
8. Information to all participants, and action addressess, starting from the Governor of Sind down to the staff of various sections was provided by the designated agencies without any loss of time. There were, however, some delays due to late activation of some telephone lines, and the failure of the Duty Airport Officer to complete his task.
9. Various offices earmarked to function as elements of anti-hijacking plan were put into operation with minor delays at a couple of places.
10. There were some problems of crowding in Operations Control room and some extra rooms for civil administration were being demanded near the Command Headquarters.
11. Director General personally re-emphasised essential instructions, at various times during the emergency, highlighting the following:-
  - (a) Clearing of the scene of accident and institution of proper cordoning of the area by Airport Security Force.
  - (b) Arranging extra fire vehicles and working out their drill for operation and refuelling.
  - (c) Arranging adequate number of ambulances and positioning them near the scene of accident.

(d) Determining/.....



- (d) Determining and recording the number of beds available in the hospitals and the number of rooms available in the hotels for accommodating the casualties and passengers.
- (e) Arranging portable lights with a generator in case required for any operation at night.
- (f) Keeping the airport operating normally for all other flights until the time that some action was required to be taken.
- (g) Making proper traffic arrangements on the roadside.

12. Director General had to personally visit and monitor various activities where some problems were being faced. This highlighted the need of a mobile command post.

13. The operational side of the airport i.e. the handling of incoming and outgoing flights, was being conducted satisfactorily. This is evident from the following:

- (a) Only one aircraft departure was delayed by about an hour.
- (b) Only three aircraft were held in the air for 42 minutes, 8 minutes and 3 minutes respectively.
- (c) No diversions were ordered/executed.
- (d) Airfield was closed only for 9 minutes.

14. There were adequate number of fire vehicles collected from various outside agencies. Their positioning, routes of operation and re-fueling points were well planned.

15. The civil administration had arranged a good number of ambulances but no Drs and nurses at the airport to man a receiving area and to supervise first aid and subsequent distribution of casualties to various hospitals.

16. The ambulances, after collecting casualties, were routed through the Medical Centre for first aid. Over 100 casualties were handled in this way.

17. Some of the ambulances went directly to the hospitals, bypassing the medical centre, which created some problems of even distribution of casualties.

18. The ambulance that came to collect the first casualty in the morning used its siren at full blast. This could be misunderstood, in a tense situation, as the approach of police or raiding force.

19. The ambulances that came at night for evacuating the casualties were using their flashing beacons near the scene of accident. This caused some disorientation of vision in the darkness.

Negotiating/.....



**Negotiating Team**

20. The designated team of C.O.S 5 Corps and Commissioner was not used. Instead Director General CAA with PAN AM representative conducted the negotiations.

**T&T Department**

21. Despite regular drills and checks, the provision of telephone communications in the Command Headquarters and elsewhere took a long time, as is evident from the following;-

- (a) The hot lines were activated one by one upto 1130 hours.
- (b) Two local telephones for Press and Television were delayed upto 1335 hours.
- (c) The operational line to the Command Post near the scene of accident was considerably delayed until about 1800 hours.
- (d) Both residential telephones of Director General were found to be inexplicably out of order at the crucial time of the incident; these were restored in about an hour's time.

22. According to T & T Department, they faced the following problems, which however do not explain all the delays;-

- (a) They had difficulty in raising Islamabad on the hot lines
- (b) Some additional hot lines to Consulate and Embassy were ordered.
- (c) Their workers were hindered by A.S.F from working near the scene of accident.

**Airport Security Force**

23. It is abundantly clear that the hi-jackers were able to gain access to the apron and then to seize the aircraft because of slackness in the security arrangements, both at the entrance to the apron and also at the steps of the aircraft.

24. After the hijackers got past the check post at the export cargo gate without stopping for checking, the security staff neither raised any alarm nor were organised to chase them or deter them from proceeding to the aircraft.

25. On reaching the aircraft the Hi-jackers were able to run up the stairs, two on each stairway, without any hindrance from the security staff present at the foot of the stairs.

25. Security/....



26. Security arrangements at the exit controls were not functioning properly. It allowed a hijacker to pass through while it prevented essential CAA personnel and ambulances from carrying out their duties.

27. It appears to be an unwritten law that transports of ASF and ASF uniformed personnel are not stopped or checked most of the time.

28. ASF have been disregarding apron security rules by;-

- (a) Not registering their transports with CAA.
- (b) Not getting apron permits for their transports.
- (c) Not getting apron driving permits for their drivers.

**Airline Operators.**

29. Pan Am representative were slow to provide information regarding passengers. A provisional manifest needs to be provided well before the flight and the final one just after the departure of the flight.

30. All airlines must brief the Civil Aviation Authority on any particulars of anti-hijack measures that they adopt for their aircraft.

**Police Agencies**

31. The Civil Police had provided adequate force to the CAA for guarding the exit gates and for other duties.

32. The traffic arrangements on the roadside were not adequate, resulting in congestion and crowding at different places. Greater number of traffic police personnel were needed.

**Immigration and Customs.**

33. The Immigration authorities did not have a proper understanding of what had to be done in such cases. They were tending to stop ambulances for normal immigration clearances.

34. Both the Immigration and Customs authorities need to adopt emergency systems where they could approach the passengers and carry out short checks of the passengers and casualties at their assembly points.

**Events Related to the Action.**

35. The apron lights in the vicinity of the aircraft (Bay No.9-15) were switched off under the instructions of Corp Commander as part of his Army plan.

36. The Auxillary Power Unit, providing lights, communications and airconditioning facilities unexpectedly went off at 2126 hours. This information was also available to the Commandos Office, as one of their officers went across the corridor and informed the Airport Manager.

37. The/.....



37. The Director General was at the site, alongwith the Country Manager of Pan Am, when the main aircraft lights went off. Knowing that the emergency lights of the aircraft would not last beyond 10-15 minutes, DG asked the ASF Commander, who was present at the site, to inform the Army Commander to be prepared for his operations.

38. The Director General then proceeded to the Command headquarters, where he briefed the Governor and expressed his apprehension that the fading of emergency lights may panic the hijackers into taking some undesirable actions. He advised the putting on of the apron lights. He was told to seek clearance from the Corp Commander.

39. The Corp Commander did not allow the apron lights near the aircraft to be put on but permitted the switching on of the apron lights near the Fire Station.

40. While the Command Headquarters was considering the implications, the D.G. went to the scene of accident and heard that firing had already started in the aircraft. He got the message transmitted on radio at 2150 hours that the hijackers had started shooting and that commando action should be taken immediately. This message was personally conveyed by the Airport Manager to Brig. Tariq Mahmood who was sitting in the Airport Manager's Office at the time of the start of the firing.

41. The Director General also went towards the exit gate near Terminal-2 and had the message for commando action shouted-over the megaphone as well.

#### **Action After Start of Firing.**

42. In the meantime, on returning to the scene, the D.G. and the officers accompanying him saw streams of passengers getting down the chutes and running towards Terminal-2. Some of them were made to lie down on the apron floor by the Airport Security Force guards and the Director General had to intervene to send them to Terminal-2.

43. The ambulances were called forward by the DG. On arrival, the ambulances did not park in an orderly manner. They had their beacons flashing, which created a disco effect in the darkness prevailing in the area.

44. The hi-jackers, having thrown away their arms, also ran alongwith the passengers in order to escape. One was apprehended, with the help of passengers, on the apron near the cargo gate; he was in uniform. One was apprehended inside the lounge on being recognised by an airhostess. The third one was apprehended in the car park area.

45. The/.....



45. The evacuation of the aircraft did not take very long. The ground power unit was later plugged in and the aircraft taken over by the commandos, who helped the evacuation of the casualties from the aircraft.

46. The passengers were collected in the Terminal-2 where they were looked after by the CAA staff before being taken over by the airline for further disposal. The speed and effectiveness of Civil Aviation Authority arrangements were considered good by Pan Am representatives.

47. At the Jinnah Hospital, there was some delay in the Police procedures for handling the dead bodies. The Airport Manager, alongwith the Chief Medical Officer, visited the hospitals on the morning of 6th September, 1986 and contacted the DIG to expedite the Police action.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Security at the Vehicle Entry Gates

1. Positive control to stop vehicles for a thorough security check must be exercised, even for ASF vehicles and personnel.
2. The checking process must be kept under observation by a separate armed guard/unit to intervene, with fire power if necessary, if anyone attempts to over-power the guards engaged in carrying out security checks.
3. Some means of raising alarms should be available at each of the entry posts to warn the apron area of a forced entry.
4. A mobile armed unit may be considered as back-up for patrolling the apron area, particularly when a lot of aircraft movements are taking place at night.
5. A special armed guard, separate from the ones posted at the stairways to the aircraft, for keeping a vigilance on possible armed intruder may be considered as an additional security measure.
6. A higher level of educational and intellectual background be required of persons employed as armed guards on supervisory and vigilance duties.
7. A more intensive and updated training programme for security personnel be introduced and frequent checks of reaction time and alertness of security staff be made.

### Specific Points for CAA

8. A CAA special cell may be created to keep an eye on the proper functioning of ASF and other agencies. The monitoring need not be continuous as percentage checks would also reveal weaknesses.
9. Directory of duties of each functionary should be readily available, alongwith a manageable diary, in the assigned room.



10. Each officer should follow the instructions and accomplish his tasks as speedily as possible, using alternate means, if his facilities do not work.

11. More frequent briefings and rehearsals may be held to fully familiarise each officer with his assigned duties.

#### Arrangement of Offices

12. The offices need to be re-organised in consultation with the staff of the Governor, the Corp Commander, the Chief Secretary and the Commissioner.

13. While re-arranging the rooms for the future, the following may be kept in mind:

- a. Command Headquarters may be shifted to a better organised place, possibly the Airport Manager's office.
- b. The Provincial civil administration may be provided a room close to the Command Headquarters.
- c. The Ops control room appears too crowded in its present composition; it may be sub-divided.
- d. A separate Army Command Post under the Corp Commander may be required.
- e. A separate room to house the essential services elements like the fire and medical services may be needed to carryout detailed planning regarding fire fighting and evacuation of casualties and passengers.
- f. A joint room for handling non-operational activities may be earmarked in which representative of Army, CAA, Airline, Police and others may be accommodated.

14. A full fledged information centre may be provided in the concourse hall, with the following facilities:

- a. One or more telephones, whose numbers may be pre-publicised.



- b. Adequate display boards to put up the list of passengers and essential information from time to time.
- c. Adequate number of personnel to handle both the telephone and the verbal queries from more than one person at a time.
- d. A press information officer should be present at this centre throughout for guiding foreign and local press representatives.

#### The Apron Area

15. All the apron lights should be controllable by a centralised panel in the ATC tower from where these lights could be operated individually and collectively as required.

16. A set of flood lights, operated by a mobile generator, should be available to be deployed at the scene of occurrence. These lights should be so mounted that their direction and height could be adjusted as required.

17. A CAA command post vehicle, with a bullet proof dome and front glass, with 3 - 4 positions, each with adequate communications, should be available at the apron. This could be used primarily by the DG but it could also be utilised by the negotiating team.

18. Fire and rescue control vehicle, fitted both with radio and loud speakers, should also be available to direct both the fire vehicles and the rescue ambulances to ensure speedy and effective handling of both types of emergency operations.

19. There is a need to coordinate the various elements of the Army, ASF, Civil Aviation and others at the scene of accident, particularly during operation and evacuation of aircraft. This duty may be assigned to the Army commander.

#### Processing of Casualties

20. A forward receiving area in one of the terminals would further reduce the reaction time to do the following:



- a. To provide first aid to casualties.
- b. To label casualties and then to send them alternatively to various hospitals, under a pre-planned scheme.

21. The ambulances should be parked closed to the receiving area and should be better controlled in their movement and parking to pick-up the casualties.

22. The ambulances need not operate their sirens and flash lights on the apron area unless absolutely necessary.

23. Coordinating officers should be sent to each of the selected hospitals in order both to coordinate the handling of the casualties and also to provide up-to-date information to the Chief Medical Officer.

24. Passengers should be received in the nearest terminal building.

25. Custom, Immigration and other checks, if unavoidable, should be short and fast. These could be carried out where the passengers are assembled; the checked passengers should be progressively segregated.

#### Telecommunication

26. The T & T Department may be asked to work out a fool proof system of providing all the designated connections within the shortest possible time; hot lines should come on almost immediately.

#### General Points

27. Arrangements for taking photographs at the scene of the accident, in the casualty receiving area and elsewhere as required must be done immediately.

28. More traffic police and better traffic arrangements are needed to control and channelise the rush of people visiting the airport during emergencies.



Commendations

29. Edhi Trust may be suitably commended for providing many of the ambulances and for an excellent job of handling the casualties in a methodical and modern manner.

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