

INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE
INCIDENT TO PIAC F-27 REG. MK. AP-ALN
WHICH OCCURRED ON 31ST AUGUST, 1982 AT
GILGIT AIRPORT.

Authority : Director General of Civil Aviation.

Memorandum : NO:IB/7-11/82 dated 21st December, 1982. (App. "A").

1. Aircraft Information:

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|---|-----------------------------|
| 1.1. Aircraft type and
Manufacturer Serial No. | : F-27
Con: 10164. |
| 1.2. Registration Marks | : AP-ALN |
| 1.3. Date of construction | : 1960. |
| 1.4. Certificate of Airworthiness | : Valid. |
| 1.5. Certificate of Registration | : Valid. |
| 1.6. Certificate of Maintenance | : Valid. |
| 1.7. Engines | : Two rolls Royce Dart 528. |

2. Crew Information:

2.1. Pilot-in-Command:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 2.1.1. Name | : Mr. Intikhab Wahid. |
| 2.1.2. Date of birth | : 1-4-1947. |
| 2.1.3. Licence held & No. | : A.L.T.P. Licence No: 451. |
| 2.1.4. Medical date with
status. | : 20-06-1982 (Fit) |
| 2.1.5. Type(s) held | : F-27 Boeing 707-720B
(Group-II). |
| 2.1.6. Type current | : F-27 in Group-I. |
| 2.1.7. Grand total | : 6559:00 Hrs. |
| 2.1.8. Total in Command | : 4033:13 Hrs. |
| 2.1.9. Total in Command
on F-27. | : 3779:58 Hrs. |
| 2.1.10. F. I. Rating | : Valid. |
| 2.1.11. Other Rating | : Route training/Check Pilot. |

2.2. Pilot Under Route Check.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.2.1. Name | : Mr. Zafar Jawaid. |
| 2.2.2. Date of birth | : 2-9-1953. |
| 2.2.3. Licence held & No. | : A.L.T.P. Licence No: 520. |
| 2.2.4. Medical date with
status. | : 9-8-1982 (Fit) |

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2.2.5.	Type(s) held	: F-27 Boeing 707-720B in Group-II.
2.2.6.	Type current	: F-27 in Group 1.
2.2.7.	Grand total	: 4144:39 Hrs on 16-8-82.
2.2.8.	Total in Command	: 2503:28 Hrs.
2.2.9.	Total in Command on F-27.	: 2209:44 Hrs.
2.2.10.	F. I. Rating.	: Valid.
2.2.11.	Other Rating	: Route training/Check Pilot.

2.3. Co-Pilot.

2.3.1.	Name	: Mr.Tariq Qadeer Rana.
2.3.2.	Date of birth	: 1-11-1953.
2.3.3.	Licence held & No.	: C.P.L. No:888.
2.3.4.	Type(s) held	: Cessna-150/172 in Group-I.
2.3.5.	Type current	: F-27 in Group-II.
2.3.6.	Medical date with status.	: 26-6-1982 (Fit).
2.3.7.	Grand total	: 585:19 Hrs. Approx.
2.3.8.	Total in Command	: 233:00 Hrs. Approx.
2.3.9.	Total as Co-Pilot on F-27.	: 270:00 Hrs. Approx.

3. SUMMARY.

3.1. M/s. P.I.A.C's F-27 type of aircraft operated scheduled passenger flight No:PK-405 to Gilgit Airport on the 31st August,1982.

3.2. It was reported that during landing PK-405, using runway-25, touched right of the centre line. It travelled on the runway for a short distance till it went on the "Katcha", right of runway. It covered a distance of approximately 900 feet before it again came on the runway. No one was injured.

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3.3. The Flight Crew did not report abnormality. The ground engineering staff therefore did not carry out heavy landing check.

4. INJURY TO PERSONS:

4.1. No one was injured.

5. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT:

5.1. No damage reported.

6. OTHER DAMAGES:

6.1. None.

7. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION:

7.1. Flights to Gilgit are required to be operated under the visual Flight Rules.

7.2. Weather was not a factor.

8. AIDS TO NAVIGATION:

8.1. There are no Radio Navigation Aids at this airport. The flights operate under the visual Flight Rules.

8.2. Aids to Navigation were not a factor in this incident.

9. COMMUNICATION:

9.1. The aircraft was in radio contact with the Control Tower before and after landing at Gilgit Airport.

9.2. Radio communication was not a factor.

10. AERODROME AND GROUND FACILITIES:

10.1. There are hills on right hand side known as China hill. It appears close to approach path of aircraft when approaching runway 25. Proximity of the hill to the right wing tip is felt when turning on finals.

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10.2. It is likely that certain pilots may feel alarmed and initiate the turn earlier than required due to incorrect rising terrain perception.

11. FLIGHT RECORDER:

11.1. This aircraft is fitted with a cockpit voice recorder (C.V.R) and a Flight Data Recorder (F.D.R).

11.2. The cockpit voice recorder contains recording of only 30 minutes preceding the time it is removed from the aircraft. Since the aircraft had flown many hours after the incident, read out for this flight could not be obtained.

11.3. Since it was considered that the Flight Data Recorder would provide some useful information, M/s. P.I.A.C. were requested vide letter No:IB/7-11/82 dated 20th September, 1982 to provide read out for this flight, containing the approach and landing phase of flight No. PK-405 of the 31st August, 1982.

11.4. M/s. P.I.A.C. have provided a read out (APP"B1"). This read out has been plotted on paper and forms part of this report (APP. "B-2").

12. WRECKAGE:

12.1. This aircraft had not sustained any visible damage. It therefore operated the return flight. The aircraft was therefore not available at the site of the incident.

13. FIRE:

13.1. No fire occurred during or after the incident.

14. SURVIVAL ASPECT:

14.1. After the aircraft came to a stop on the runway, it was taxied to the apron under its own power. Crew and passengers of this aircraft exited the aeroplane through normal exits.

15. TEST AND RESEARCH:

15.1. The investigator was in the cockpit of an F-27 aircraft operating a schedule passenger flight to Gilgit. The aircraft made an approach on runway 25. During the approach it was noted that during the turn to final approach, to an untrained eye it gave a feeling that the aircraft was close to the hill. When the turn was completed and the aircraft ~~was~~ established on final, the right wing tip was well clear of this hill. It was noted that this situation may cause concern to inexperienced pilots who do not have correct distance perception when approaching rising terrain. No incident/accident has occurred in the past due to this reason.

15.2. In the circumstances mentioned in the preceding para it is likely that a pilot, when not familiar with such a situation may initiate a turn earlier than required. Consequently distance from the turning point to touch down will be reduced. Such an attempt would therefore leave very little time at the disposal of the pilot to make a proper settled approach. Therefore during an unsettled approach the pilot will not be able to level the aircraft before touch down. At an airport where left hand approaches are made the aircraft may have some amount of left bank at touch down. Consequently the left main landing gear will come in contact with the runway surface before the right landing gear.

16. OBSERVATIONS:

16.1. Nil.

17. SCENE OF INCIDENT:

17.1. The investigator arrived at Gilgit Airport at 10.30 A.M on the 26th May, 1983, his earlier two attempts to visit Gilgit having failed due adverse weather enroute. Immediately on arrival the investigator visited the runway and fair weather strip right and left side of the runway. During this visit tyre foot prints of F-27 type of aircraft were noticed on runway 25 and right side of runway on the fair weather strip. Site diagram was prepared and photographs taken. Only those considered necessary for this report have been used.

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17.2. The investigator proceeded to the Headquarters of Force Commander, Northern Area to contact Maj. Khurshid to obtain information about the military persons who had travelled on board flight No:PK-405 of the 31st August,82. The investigator handed over the passenger manifest to him which had earlier been obtained from the Station Manager, M/s. P.I.A.C. Islamabad. (APP. "C"). Maj. Khurshid after going through the passenger manifest informed the investigator that persons mentioned in the manifest had been posted out and it was not possible for him to find out their addresses.

17.3. Address of Captain Jawaid of Pak.Army, who had visited the runway was obtained. He had been promoted to the rank of Major and posted in 9 Northern Light Infantry at Gilgit. His statement could not be obtained. He declined to give any statement without an authority from the G.H.Q. It entailed lengthy procedure. The investigations were already delayed and to follow the procedure via the G.H.Q. would delay the report further.

17.4. The Airport Manager was on tour to Islamabad. Contact was made with him at Islamabad to record his statement. He requested that he may be permitted to write his statement after consulting his official record which was available at Gilgit. He has sent his written statement. (APP. "D").

17.5. The following were available at the Airport Fire Station, who witnessed the arrival of flight No:PK-405 of the 31st August,1982:-

17.5.1. Mr. Dado Khan, Fire Leader.

17.5.2. Mr. Ghulam Hussain, First Aid Crew.

17.5.3. Mr. Hubbi Ali, M.T. Driver.

17.5.4. Mr. Habib-ullah, M.T. Driver.

17.5.5. Mr. Muhammad Shaikh, Fire Operator.

17.5.6. Mr. Ali Goher, Clerk.

17.5.7. Mr. Mumrez Khan, M. F. Driver.

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18. WITNESSES:

18.1. Statements of the following were recorded at Gilgit:-

- 18.1.1. Mr. Dado Khan, Fire Leader.
- 18.1.2. Mr. Ghulam Hussain, First Aid Crew.
- 18.1.3. Mr. Hubbi Ali, M.T. Driver.
- 18.1.4. Mr. Habib-ullah, M.T. Driver.
- 18.1.5. Mr. Muhammad Shaikh, Fire Operator.
- 18.1.6. Mr. Ali Goher, Clerk.
- 18.1.7. Mr. Mumrez Khan, M. F. Driver.

18.2. Statement of Mian Nazir, the Airport Manager was received by post.

18.3. The Airport Manager, Gilgit during his verbal statement had mentioned that Captain Akram Baig of M/s. P.I.A.C. who used to fly as a pilot in the Northern Area during the period when this incident occurred was shown tyre marks on the runway and right side of the runway on the fair weather strip. The Airport Manager has confirmed his statement in writing. It was therefore considered necessary to record statement of Captain Akram Baig, which was done at Karachi.

18.4. Statement of Mian Nazir, Airport Manager, Gilgit was received by post and forms part of this report.

18.5. Statement of Capt. Akram Baig, holder of A.L.T.P. Licence No:532 was recorded in Karachi. (APP."E").

19. DISCUSSIONS:

19.1. On the 31st August, 1982 M/s. P.I.A.C. operated a schedule passenger flight No:PK-405 to Gilgit. Captain Intikhab Wahid, holder of A.L.T.P. Licence No.451 a Flight Instructor on F-27 type of aircraft and Chief Pilot (North), Captain Zafar Jawaid holder of A.L.T.P. Licence No:520 a Flight Instructor on F-27 type of aircraft, a Pilot on route familiarization to Gilgit and First Officer Tariq Qadeer Rana holder of C.P.L. No:888 a Co-Pilot formed

compliment of crew for this flight. It has been stated by the crew of this aircraft that Capt. Zafar Jawaid occupied the left hand seat while Capt. Intikhab Wahid occupied the right hand seat in the cockpit of this F-27 type of aircraft during flight to Gilgit. It is understood from the statements of Pilots that Captain Zafar Jawaid handled controls of the aircraft through-out its flight.

19.2. Capt. Zafar Jawaid has stated that his approach was unsteady. He touched on the right side of the centre line and went to the edge of the runway. It was brought back to the centre.

19.3. Capt. Intikhab Wahid has also stated that the aircraft touch on right side of the runway and it was gradually brought back to the centre.

19.4. Capt. Intikhab Wahid and Capt. Zafar Jawaid have stated that approach of this flight was unsettled. This fact is confirmed by the read out of the Flight Data Recorder (APP. "B-1"). The read out shows that the rate of descent varied between 500 feet per minute to 2000 feet per minute. The heading varied between 330 degrees ~~to 285 degrees~~ to 235 degrees. The runway heading is 250 degrees. In view of the unsettled approach it is probable that an uncontrolled landing occurred and this is borne out by the fact that the aircraft left the runway after landing.

19.5. Capt. Zafar Jawaid has correctly stated that aircraft touched on the right of the centre line. This fact is confirmed by the tyre marks on the runway. These marks on the runway indicate that the aircraft was at a divergence angle of 20 degrees to the right of the runway heading. (APP. "F"). On the runway where the aircraft has made the initial contact. There are tyre marks of only one tyre on the runway. It indicates that the wings of the aircraft were not level, and it was still in the process of turning. Had the wing been level, both the main landing gears would have left marks on the runway. This fact is also supported by the read out of the Flight Data Recorder which shows the aircraft touch down on a heading of 270 degrees and then changing to a heading of 235 degrees. (APP. "B1-B2").

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19.6. After the position where the tyre marks show that the aircraft departed the runway, marks of the second tyre are visible on the fair weather strip to the right of tyre marks of the tyre which contacted the runway surface initially. (APP. "F"). It therefore can be concluded that the marks on the runway are those of the left main landing gear. It also proves that the aircraft was in the process of left turn at touch down.

19.7. Tyre marks on the fair weather strip show that both the tyres had come in contact with the ground. The distance measured between the tyres of the main landing gear marks came to 23 feet 9 inches. On 31st August, 1982 when F-27 flight No:PK-405 operated to Gilgit, the investigator who was also at Gilgit airport, asked Captain Jehanzeb Afridi, Commander of this flight as to what was distance between the two wheels of the main landing gear of an F-27. He consulted the aeroplane flight manual and pointed out that it was 23 feet and 9 inches. It therefore confirms that these were the tyre marks of an F-27 type of aircraft. Captain Akram Baig, a pilot with M/s. P.I.A.C. who has done extensive flying to Gilgit and Skardu and who had visited the runway at Gilgit alongwith the Airport Manager, Gilgit the day after the incident, has also confirmed that the marks he saw on the runway and the fair weather strip were those of an F-27 type of aircraft. (APP. "E"). He has also confirmed that he did not see these tyre marks on the runway before the incident. (APP. "E").

19.8. The following crew were present at the fire station when this flight No:PK-405 made an approach and landing on runway 25 on the 31st August, 1982:-

- 19.8.1. Mr. Dado Khan, Fire Leader.
- 19.8.2. Mr. Ghulam Hussain, First Aid Crew.
- 19.8.3. Mr. Hubbi Ali, M.T. Driver.
- 19.8.4. Mr. Habib-ullah, M.T. Driver.
- 19.8.5. Mr. Muhammad Shaikh, Fire Operator.
- 19.8.6. Mr. Ali Goher, Clerk.
- 19.8.7. Mr. Mumrez Khan, M. F. Driver.

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19.9. The above crew, by their job discription are required to watch each approach, landing and take-off. Some of them have service as long as twenty five years. They have spent their total service in this job. Most of them have been at Gilgit Airport for a considerable length of time. They have seen numerous approaches and landings. They can therefore be treated as expert witnesses.

19.10. All of them have stated under oath that on 31st August, 1982 they saw this F-27 aircraft departing the runway surface after initiate contact with the runway. (APP. " G "). They all have stated that they saw the aircraft heading towards them. This fact is supported by the angle shown by the tyre on the runway, (APP. " F "), and the Flight Data Recorder read out. These marks show that at the time the aircraft was leaving the runway it was heading towards the fire station. Therefore concern of the crew positioned at the fire station was genuine. The Airport Manager, who was in the control tower has also stated that the aircraft touched on the runway and then proceeded towards the right.

19.11. After the aircraft left the runway surface, it has travelled on the fair weather strip, right of the runway for 900 feet. Tyre marks are visible on this strip. These marks were shown to Captain Akram Baig, during his visit to Gilgit by the Airport Manager, Gilgit. (APP. " E "). This supports statement of the Airport Manager, who has stated that the aircraft travelled on this area for 900 feet. The tyre marks were still visible on the fair weather strip when the investigator visited Gilgit almost 9 months after the incident. (APP. " F ").

19.12. After a travel of 900 feet on the fair weather strip, as stated in the preceding paragraph, the aircraft made a converging angle of approx 15 degrees to the runway heading. Once again this fact has been confirmed by the tyre marks. (APP. " F "). Captain Akram Baig, after seeing the photographs which form part of this report, has confirmed that these are the same marks that he saw during his visit to Gilgit after the incident had occurred. The Airport Manager, Gilgit has also stated that after its travel on the fair weather strip, the aircraft came back on the runway. Read out of the Flight Data Recorder also confirms this fact. (APP. " B-1 ").

19.13. Tyre marks on the runway at a point approximately 1500 hundred feet from the threshold of runway 25, continue for 300 feet on the runway. (APP. " F "). These marks are not visible after reaching 7 feet short of the centre line of runway. (APP. "F"). Both the Pilots have stated that the aircraft was gradually brought to the centre. The tyre marks confirm that it was a gradual left turn (15 degrees).

19.14. When standing on the apron the first 1500 feet of runway 25 is out of sight of an observer if he is positioned on the apron. M/s Zianat Shan, Senior Technical and Nazar Shah, Traffic Assist, employees of M/s. P.I.A.C., who were standing on the apron could not see the aircraft touch down and leaving the runway surface. They have therefore stated that they saw the aircraft at the edge of the runway. They also saw some dust in the air. These witnesses saw the aircraft when it had just re-entered the runway. The dust they saw was probably that which was kicked up in the air during the aircraft roll on the fair weather strip. (APP. " O & R ").

19.15. Earlier the Chief Investigator (Accidents) after receiving information that on the 31st August, 1982 at one of the Northern area airfields, a schedule passenger flight during its landing phase had touched in the "KATCHA", flashed signals to Civil Aerodromes Skardu and Gilgit requesting them to intimate if an incident had occurred. Civil Aerodrome Skardu replied intimating all flights to Skardu had operated normal. (APP. "H"). Airport Manager, Gilgit vide his signal No: PYB007/09 1553 WPA 81. (APP. "J") informed that "PK-405, AP-ALN F-27 Captain Intikhab Wahid was given landing clearance at 0637 while on final approach runway 25. During landing phase this F-27 aircraft touched on "Katcha" slightly right of the runway near the threshold. Aircraft rolled about 900 feet on "Katcha" then came over the runway and landed 0638. No apparent damage to the aircraft was observed. Enquired from Capt. Intikhab who replied the approach was slightly towards right but the landing was normal".

19.16. After the information mentioned in the preceding para was received, the Chief Investigator (Accidents) decided to investigate the incident. He also decided that this incident be investigated by M/s. P.I.A.C. Capt. S.S. Akbar, the Director Flight Operations was authorized,

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vide the Department of Civil Aviation letter No:IB/7-11/82 dated the 15th September,1982, to investigate the incident. He was directed to forward the investigation report together with his recommendations. He was also required to intimate the circumstances under which the pilot and the operator failed to report the incident to the Director General. (APP. "K"). While this letter was being drafted an anonymous letter addressed to Mr.Syed Shamin Akbar, Director Flight Operations and copies endorsed to Maj. Gen. (Retd). Rahim Khan, Chairman P.I.A.C., the D.G.C.A. Karachi and Air Commodore (Retd). Patrick D. Callaghan, was received by the Chief Inspector. He enclosed a copy of this letter alongwith the letter, authorizing the D.F.O. to carry out the investigations. (APP. "K").

19.17. On the 21st September,1982 a letter No:CS/05:82:494 dated September 19, 1982 was received from M/s. P.I.A.C., stating that investigations were in progress and all efforts were being made to expeditiously complete the investigation report.

19.18. When no information was received by 26th Sep.,1982, a phone call was made to M/s. P.I.A.C.,under instructions from the Chief Investigator (Accidents). This phone call was followed by letter No:IB/7-11/82 dated Karachi the 27th September,1982. It was further followed up by reminder No:IB/7-11/82 dated the 4th October,1982.

19.19. Having received no reply, the Chief Investigator (Accidents) wrote a D.O. letter to Mr. M.M. Salim,Managing Director, P.I:A.C. explaining position of the case. A letter dated 21 - 10-1982 was received from M/s. P.I.A.C. stating that ²³the report was ready and awaiting D.F.O's perusal on his return from flying duties. It further stated that the report would be submitted before the end of the month.

19.20. Till 6th November,1982 no information was received from M/s. P.I.A.C. on the subject. A reminder was therefore issued on the 6th November,1982. (APP. "L").

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19.21. A letter dated 25th November, 1982 on the subject was received from M/s. P.I.A.C. The letter stated that the aircraft was not involved in any mishap. It has been observed that copy of this letter was endorsed to Flight Inspector Pilot (Chief) by name.

19.22. M/s. P.I.A.C. has supplied only copies of the statements collected by them. They have not forwarded any report. However the investigator was supplied photo copy of the report by Wing Commander (Retd) N.A. Siddiqi, which could hardly be called an investigation report. (APP. "P").

19.23. M/s. P.I.A.C. have stated in their letter No: CS/05:82:494 dated the 19th September, 1982 that the investigations were in progress and all efforts were being made to expeditiously complete the investigation report. This statement of M/s. P.I.A.C. is contrary to available evidence. Wing Commander (Retd). N.A. Siddiqi, Safety Officer (Ground and Technical), who was appointed investigator by M/s. P.I.A.C. (APP. "M"), has testified that he received orders to proceed to Gilgit on the 13th October, 1982. He proceeded to Gilgit on the 14th October, 82 to record the statement. Statement recorded by him at Gilgit are dated 14th October, 1982. It is therefore evident that no or little efforts were made for 25 days to start the investigation.

19.24. Wing Commander (Retd). N.A. Siddiqi has also stated that he restricted his sphere of investigations to employees of M/s. P.I.A.C. because he was not detailed by D.G.C.A. (APP. "N"). It appears that information with regard to the fact that the inquiry was being conducted on behalf of the regularity authority was with-held from him. Therefore the above mentioned investigating officer did not carry-out in depth investigation. He even did not record statements of the Airport Manager, crew positioned at the fire station at the time of incident and many others who would have provided useful information. He also did not obtain read out of the Flight Data Recorder which contained information that could have been used in the report to come to a proper conclusion. Basing opinion on statement of two persons, who it transpires could not see the aircraft during the early stages of landing, due to their restricted vision from their position on the apron. is not considered fair to the process of investigation.

The others who recorded their statement were the flight crew themselves. They have denied the incident.

19.25. On scrutiny of investigation report collected by the Investigator of this incident from Wing Commander (Retd). N.A. Siddiqi of M/s. P.I.A.C., there is no evidence on record to show that the investigating officer, appointed by the airline, visited the scene of incident. He did not visit the runway or the fair weather strip to see the tyre marks for himself which were visible even when writer of this report visited Gilgit.

19.26. Captain Akram Baig a pilot with M/s. P.I.A.C. has logged close to 2700 hours as Pilot-in-Command on F-27 type of aircraft while in employment of M/s. P.I.A.C. All of this flying has been done during his posting at M/s. P.I.A.C.'s Rawalpindi base. This is in addition to his experience as a Co-Pilot on F-27 type of aircraft. Captain Akram Baig can therefore be treated as an expert witness. He had initially declined to record his statement expressing his apprehension that he may be subjected to hostile treatment by the Flight Operation Directorate in the event they come to know about his recording this statement. However, when he was administered oath, he recorded his statement, which forms parts of this report. (APP. "E").

19.27. Capt. Zafar Javed holder of A.L.T.P. Licence No:520 is employed by M/s. P.I.A.C. as a pilot on the F-27 type of aircraft. He holds position of route training pilot and Flight Instructor Rating. He has 2209:44 hours Command experience on F-27 type of aircraft. His experience as a Flight Instructor is approximately 146.46 hours.

19.28. Capt. Zafar Javed was on a route familiarization trip to Gilgit. He occupied the left hand seat in the cockpit while it has been stated that Captain Intikhab Wahid occupied the right hand seat. Landing technique at all the runways is almost the same. Once the airfield is in sight, a Pilot should experience no difficulty in aligning the aircraft on approach path. Although slightly steep or slightly shallow approach may be expected when making an eye-ball approach. Not aligning the aircraft with the runway heading while on approach path is not explainable. Leaving alone holder of a Flight Instructor Rating, an average pilot is expected to execute this

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manoeuvre with out difficulty. In fact command on a particular type of aircraft is granted only when the Pilot demonstrates to an Flight Examiner that he could performs this manoeuvre satisfactorily under varying flight configurations.

19.29. Capt.Zafar Javed has not operated to Gilgit as a Pilot-in-Command after this incident. M/s. P.I.A.C. has laid down that before a commander on an F-27 type of aircraft is promoted to a higher equipment, he will be required to do 50 hours of flying to airfields in Northern area including Gilgit Airport. In case of Pilot mentioned above, this requirement was completed to airports other than Gilgit. Statement for the month of January, 1983. (APP. " O ").

19.30. An opportunity was granted to Capt.Intikhab Wahid as required under Rule 331 of Civil Aviation Rules 1978. His reply does not contain anything which could change outcome of the investigations.

20. FINDINGS:

✓ 20.1. The aircraft was operating schedule passenger service.

✓ 20.2. The crew was properly licenced. They were holding valid rating on the type.

20.3. Captain Intikhab Wahid was on board this flight as route check/training pilot. He was therefore Pilot-in-Command of this aircraft.

20.4. Capt.Zafar Javed holds command rating on F-27 type of aircraft. He is a Flight Instructor on the type

20.5. The aircraft held valid Certificate of Registration, Certificate of Airworthiness and Certificate of Maintenance.

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- ✓ 20.6. There was no unserviceability reported or recorded by the Pilot during or before departure or after landing of this flight.
- ✓ 20.7. The aircraft operated flight No:PK-405 from Islamabad to Gilgit on the 31st August, 1982. It made an unsteady approach.
- ✓ 20.8. Followed by an unsteady approach the Pilot who was operating controls of this aircraft, made an uncontrolled landing in this he touched down on the right side of the runway centre line at a divergence angle of 20 degrees to the right.
- ✓ 20.9. The aircraft was in the process of a left turn when it came in contact with runway surface. The aircraft was heading 270 degrees when the left gear touched the runway surface. The runway heading is 250 degrees.
- ✓ 20.10. The aircraft departed the runway surface on a heading of 270 degrees.
- ✓ 20.11. The aircraft travelled on the fair weather strip for 900 feet before it re-entered the runway.
- ✓ 20.12. The aircraft entered the runway at a converging angle of 15 degrees.
- ✓ 20.13. The aircraft was brought to centre of runway gradually.
- 20.14. An opportunity was granted to Capt. Intikhab Wahid as provided under Rule 331 of the Civil Aviation Rules 1978. His reply does not contain anything which could change the outcome of the investigation.

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✓ 21. CAUSE:

21.1. Poor piloting technique.

22. RECOMMENDATIONS:

22.1. Suitable action be considered against the pilots.

Dated: 17th July, 1983.

 17/7/83
(CAPTAIN FARMANUDDIN)
INVESTIGATOR-IN-CHARGE.
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY.

JAWAID/


OBSERVATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL C.A.A.

1. This report has been delayed to an extent that the evidence available is probably incomplete.
2. I have gone through this report, and observe that there has been suppression of facts by all concerned in P.I.A in the case of this incident. The evidence available indicates that an incident did occur.
3. The Airport Manager failed to report the incident, and only did so when asked by the Headquarters. However, since that time adequate instructions to all concerned have been issued and all incidents/occurrences are being regularly reported.
4. Incidents/occurrences are now being investigated by C.A.A. Personnel, and investigations are not being left to the Airline.
5. In view of the long delay in finalisation of this report and the possibility that some important evidence could have been lost or misinterpreted, I have decided to be lenient in my action against the flight crew, who were involved.
6. The following actions are to be taken:-

X E 18-A a) A warning letter^X is to be issued to Captain Intikhab Wahid A.L.T.P. Licence No.451 a copy of which is to be placed on his records.

= E 19-A b) The approval² for Captain Zafar Jawaid to act as Instructor/Route and Check Pilot and any other supervisory approvals are to be withdrawn for a period of one year with immediate effect.

Dated: 19 July 83.


(A.V.M. KHURSHID ANWAR MIRZA)
DIRECTOR GENERAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY.

APP. 'F'₁



012

AIRCRAFT IN A LEFT TURN. NOTE HILL ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE.

APP.
F₂



013

AIRCRAFT ON FINAL.

2

APP. "F3"



3. FIRST CONTACT OF THE LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR.



APP. "F4"

4. TYRE MARKS SHOWING THE ANGLE AT WHICH THE LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR CONTACTED THE RUNWAY SURFACE. NOTE THAT THERE ARE NO MARKS OF RIGHT HAND LANDING GEAR.

APP. F5

017



5.

CLOSE UP OF THE LEFT HAND LANDING
GEAR MARKS.

025

6.



APP. F6

TYRE MARKS SHOWING LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING
GEAR DEPARTING THE RUNWAY SURFACE. NOTE
THE CONTROL TOWER AND THE FIRE STATION
BUILDINGS ON RIGHT OF THE RUNWAY.

APP. F7⁴



626

7.

RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR MARKS ON THE FAIR WEATHER STRIP, RIGHT OF THE RUNWAY. THE LEFT HAND LANDING GEAR MARKS CAN NOT BE SEEN IN THE PHOTOGRAPH DUE TO SHRUBS ALONG SIDE THE RUNWAY EDGE.

APP. F8⁴



627

8.

LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR TYRE MARKS SHOW RE-ENTRY OF THE AIRCRAFT ON TO THE RUNWAY. IT GRADUALLY DESIPATES WHEN APPROACH IN THE CENTRE LINE. PLEASE ALSO NOTE THE AIRCRAFT MAKING A GRADUAL LEFT TURN TO COME TO CENTRE OF RUNWAY.